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The House of Lords decision in Barclays Bank v. O’Brieni established clear 
authority that a surety transaction may be set aside on the grounds that the 
creditor has either actual or constructive notice of the transaction having been 
procured through some wrongdoing such as undue influence on the part of the 
debtor.ii One of the key “reasonable steps” that the creditor is expected to take so 
as to avoid being fixed with constructive notice is to urge the surety to seek 
independent legal advice. Cases post-O’Brien reveal not only how problematic the 
independent legal advice requirement may be in practice but also the emergence 
of two conflicting lines of authority.iii The first line of authority illustrates how the 
requirement has whittled down to a minimal one where the creditor may 
successfully avoid being fixed with notice of the surety’s equity to set aside through 
the formal gesture of informing the surety to seek independent legal advice.iv 
The second line of authority may be found in the dissenting judgment of 
Hobhouse L.J. in Banco Exterior Internacional v. Mann,v and cases like Credit 
Lyonnais Bank Nederland v. Burchvi and Royal Bank of Scotland v. Etridge (No. 
1).vii This line supports the view of a higher standard of advice being required 
where the courts will scrutinise not only the actual advice given but also whether 
the advice is competent and if not, whether the deficient advice should be 
attributed to the creditor. Given these conflicting views of the independent legal 
advice requirement, the Court of Appeal attempted to provide some clarity and 
consistency in Royal Bank of Scotland v. Etridge (No. 2).viii Etridge (No. 2) served 
the useful purpose of highlighting the significance of providing sufficiently detailed 
advice as so to enable the surety to give her informed consent.  
The shift in focus to the surety’s informed consent will, however, require 
greater disclosure of information about the debtor’s financial position to the surety 
and her solicitor. This may, in turn, raise further issues which have not been 
adequately considered by the courts. In particular, a higher standard of advice will 
raise issues of confidentiality and conflicts of interest, as well as the extent of the 
solicitor’s independence and his ability to satisfy this higher standard of advice. 
The purpose of this article is to consider the extent to which the guidance given in 
Etridge (No. 2) on what is to be expected of solicitors when giving independent 
legal advice will be practicable in surety transactions. 
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Etridge (No. 2)  - Clarity after the confusion? 
 
In Etridge (No. 2), Lord Stuart-Smith L.J. reiterated that one of the principal 
purposes of the “reasonable steps” requirement laid down by Lord Browne-
Wilkinson in O’Brien was to provide a practical solution which enabled the 
matrimonial home to be used as security for raising credit and at the same time 
offer vulnerable sureties proper protection against advantage-taking. In situations 
where the surety alleges some wrongdoing, for example undue influence, one 
obvious way to rebut the presumption of undue influence is to provide evidence 
that the surety had entered the transaction after having received advice from some 
independent and qualified person who is fully informed of the material facts. 
However, cases since O’Brien have demonstrated that the protection of sureties 
through the provision of independent legal advice has in many cases proved 
“illusory”.ix The advice given has often been “perfunctory, limited to an explanation 
of the documents and inadequate to dispel [the surety’s] understanding of the real 
extent of the liability which she was undertaking.”x 
In an attempt to clarify the confusion that has arisen in this area, the Court 
of Appeal provided an extensive analysis of the law and clearer guidelines on the 
steps necessary for satisfying the independent legal advice requirement. To some 
extent,  Etridge (No.2 ) forms a compromise between the two earlier lines of 
authority. It maintains the earlier position taken in cases like Mann, Midland Bank 
v. Serterxi and Massey v. Midland Bankxii that the bank is entitled to assume that 
the solicitor, when giving advice to the surety, will regard himself as owing a duty to 
the surety and will carry out this duty regardless of who introduced the solicitor to 
the surety or asked him to advise her. There is also continuing support for the 
position that the bank is entitled to rely on the fact that, in taking on the task of 
advising the surety, the solicitor has considered himself to be sufficiently 
independent.xiii 
Etridge (No.2 ) attempts to reconcile the conflict between these two lines of 
authority by stressing that perfunctory advice will clearly be inadequate to prevent 
a bank from being fixed with notice of the surety’s equity. The role of independent 
legal advice requires more and, in giving advice, the solicitor must be fully informed 
of all material facts. Although the bank is entitled to assume the independence and 
sufficiency of the solicitor’s advice to the surety, the court stated that the bank will 
not be entitled to make such an assumption if it knows or ought to know that it is 
false. This is particularly pertinent to situations where the bank is in possession of 
material information which it knows is not available to the solicitor, or where the 
transaction is so manifestly disadvantageous to the surety that it cannot be one 
which a solicitor could properly advise his client to enter.  
This approach reflects that taken by the Court of Appeal in Burch where the 
transaction was set aside on the grounds that the bank had failed to take the 
necessary reasonable steps to avoid being fixed with notice of the surety’s equity. 
In that case, although the bank’s solicitors had informed the surety that her liability 
was unlimited and that she should seek independent legal advice, no information 
was provided to her by the bank on the extent of the debtor’s current borrowings. 
Given the transaction was so manifestly disadvantageous to the surety, the court 
concluded that the bank’s failure to provide the necessary information to the surety 
and to insist on her taking independent legal advice fell short of the reasonable 
steps requirement. 
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At first glance, Etridge (No. 2) appears to have resolved two key issues that 
had emerged from the cases decided since O’Brien. The first relates to the 
constituents of independent legal advice, the other to the solicitor’s independence. 
Clearer guidelines are provided on how the independent legal advice requirement 
is to be applied and what steps are required of both banks and solicitors in fulfilling 
that requirement. Etridge (No. 2) further purports to clarify the position on conflicts 
of interest and legal advice by reaffirming the position that solicitors are prima facie 
the parties best placed to judged their own independence and the extent of the 
advice to be given. Notwithstanding the welcomed clarity of Etridge (No. 2), there 
remain questions about the efficacy of the independent legal advice requirement. 
Despite the emphasis on the importance of disclosure of material information and 
provision of more detailed advice, the treatment of the conflicts issue in Etridge 
(No. 2) has been relatively superficial. The approach further fails to shed light on 
how related issues on confidentiality and disclosure are to be dealt with.  
 
Confidentiality and Conflicts of Interest 
 
Independent legal advice has always been seen as a classic way of rebutting the 
presumption of undue influence having been exerted on a party to a transaction. 
Examples of factors which the courts have generally considered as pertinent are 
the quality of the advice given and the independence of the adviser. This raises the 
question of the meaning to be attributed to the term “independent”. The shift in 
focus to whether sufficient information has been provided to the surety to enable 
her to make an informed decision will necessarily call for the greater disclosure of 
financial information about the debtor. 
 The disclosure of such information will, however, be subject to duties of 
confidentiality by both the bankxiv and the solicitor.xv Given the respective duties of 
confidentiality of a bank and a solicitor, the increased provision of information to 
the surety will bring about greater potential for conflicts of interest. This may be 
particularly acute in situations where the solicitor acts for two or more parties in the 
transaction. 
 
(1)   The bank’s duty of confidentiality 
The contractual nature of the relationship between a bank and its customer 
imposes on the bank a duty of confidentiality with regard to the customer’s 
accounts.xvi Thus, all information relating to the customer’s accounts may not be 
disclosed by the bank to third parties, except in the following circumstances: (i) 
disclosure is under compulsion of law; (ii) there is a duty to the public to disclose; 
(iii) the bank’s interests require disclosure; and (iv) disclosure is made by the 
express or implied consent of the customer.xvii More recently, the Jack 
Committeexviii noted the limited impact that the Data Protection Act 1984 had in 
maintaining customers’ confidentiality.xix The Committee further observed that there 
were three basic reasons for the bank’s duty of confidentiality being increasingly 
undermined.xx Firstly, there has been an increasing statutory erosion of the bank’s 
duty of confidentiality as a result of a corresponding need for crime prevention and 
detection.xxi Further, the growing risk of debtor default has resulted in the 
increasing flow of customer information within the banks’ own banking groups as 
well as to credit reference agencies. 
 In surety cases, any disclosure of information by the bank regarding the 
debtor’s financial position will clearly be caught by the bank’s duty of 
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confidentiality. Allegations of breach of duty may, however, be avoided in one of 
two ways: by obtaining the debtor’s consent;xxii or by providing statutorily for the 
disclosure of such information. Given the general reluctance for such legislative 
measures to be takenxxiii, the more likely solution would be to obtain the debtor’s 
consent to disclosure.xxiv Whilst the debtor’s consent will address the issue of 
confidentiality, it does not resolve the issues regarding the extent of the disclosure 
and/or advice required to satisfy a higher standard of advice. 
 
(2)  The solicitor’s duty of confidentiality 
The solicitor-client relationship is one of the status-based relationships that has 
been recognised by English law as being fiduciary in nature. xxv In order to prevent 
abuse and to maintain the integrity of the trusting relationship, the fiduciary is 
subjected to certain duties, namely: (i) the “no conflict of interest” rule where the 
fiduciary is under a duty not to act where his own interest may conflict with that of 
his principal’s; (ii) the “no profit” rule; (iii) the undivided loyalty rule where the 
fiduciary is under a duty not to act for parties having conflicting interests; and (iv) 
the duty of confidentiality.xxvi Hence, as a fiduciary, the solicitor will owe a duty of 
confidentiality to his client. xxvii 
 When giving advice, the solicitor’s duties of undivided loyalty and 
confidentiality will clearly determine the parameters of two elements: his 
independence and the extent of the legal advice to be given to the surety. The 
solicitor’s independence may be called into question when he acts for two or more 
parties in the transaction since this may affect his ability to act with undivided 
loyalty for each client. The second element may bring into conflict the duty of 
confidentiality that the solicitor owes to his other client when offering advice to the 
surety. Hence, the solicitor’s independence, the duties of confidentiality and 
undivided loyalty which he owes to his respective clients, and the extent of the 
advice to be given to the surety are all inextricably linked.  
 
(3)   Independence of the Adviser 
It is clear in Etridge (No. 2) that, in order to satisfy the independent legal advice 
requirement, mere technical advice to the surety will not suffice and that a higher 
standard of advice is required of the solicitor. In doing so, the ability of a solicitor to 
act for two or more parties in the transaction and still maintain the level of 
independence demanded by such higher standard advice becomes increasingly 
harder to sustain.xxviii A higher standard of advice will require the solicitor to be fully 
informed of all material facts so as to enable him to advise the surety on the 
wisdom of the transaction and other prudent options available to her.xxix This is 
aimed primarily at ensuring that the surety’s consent is an informed one. At a 
practical level, the increased provision of information may, however, subject the 
solicitor to greater potential of a conflict of interest where he acts for two or more 
parties in the transaction. On the one hand, his duty of undivided loyalty imposes 
on him the duty to disclose all material facts to the surety so as to enable her to 
give her informed consent. On the other hand, the solicitor is subject to a 
corresponding duty to his other client to maintain the confidentiality of such 
information. 
A review of the surety cases indicate that the courts are not likely to take an 
overly restrictive approach towards the issue of conflict of interests.xxx A large 
majority of the cases support the view that, even where the solicitor acts for two or 
more parties in the transaction, the bank may still safely assume the solicitor’s 
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independence when advising the surety. The weight of the authorities suggests 
that the party best placed to judge the independence and extent of the advice to be 
given is the solicitor and not the bank. Hence, it is a matter for the solicitor’s 
professional judgment as to whether there exists a conflict of interest between his 
clients. Notwithstanding a possible conflict of interest, the independence of the 
solicitor is not necessarily jeopardised by his representing two or more parties to 
the transaction. There are methods of overcoming the conflicts issues, for 
example, by obtaining the clients’ informed consent.xxxi  
In Clark Boyce v. Mouatxxxii, the court stated that there is no general rule 
prohibiting a solicitor from acting for both parties in a transaction where their 
interests may conflict so long as the parties give their informed consent. This 
means consent given with full knowledge of the potential conflict of interest 
between the parties and that the solicitor may be constrained by his duties to the 
respective parties in terms of disclosure of information and the advice to be given 
to them respectively. In addition, the scope of the fiduciary relationship and the 
extent of the solicitor’s duties will depend on his client’s instructions. Hence, the 
solicitor will not be expected to go beyond his instructions to offer unsought for 
advice.  
Kelly v. Cooperxxxiii further illustrates how the use of clearly worded and 
unambiguous contractual terms such as duty-defining or exclusion clauses may 
limit the scope of the fiduciary duties owed by a fiduciary to his principal. In that 
case, the defendant was an estate agent engaged by the plaintiff to sell his 
property. Given the nature of the parties’ contract as well as the trade custom of 
the industry, the court found that the agent’s failure to disclose to the plaintiff that 
the owner of the adjacent property had also commissioned him to sell that property 
was not a breach of duty. Thus, cases like Mouat and Cooper illustrate that 
contractual arrangements and the disclosure of potential conflicts of interest for the 
purposes of obtaining the clients’ informed consent are effective ways of 
overcoming the conflicts issue. In surety cases, the instructions given to the 
solicitor will set the boundaries of the solicitor’s duties to his respective clients and 
the extent of the advice required of him.  
Continued support for this approach can be found in cases like National 
Westminster Bank v. Beatonxxxiv, Barclays Bank v. Thomsonxxxv, Banco Exterior 
Internacional v. Thomasxxxvi and Etridge (No. 2). In Beaton, the Court of Appeal 
reiterated the assumption of the solicitor’s independence. Notwithstanding that the 
solicitor had been instructed by the bank to provide legal advice to the surety, the 
court stated that such instructions were no more than a reminder to the solicitor of 
his duties to his client and did not amount to the bank having appointed the 
solicitor as its agent for the purposes of giving advice. The solicitor was therefore 
deemed to be sufficiently independent when advising the surety and any deficiency 
in the advice given could not be attributed to the bank. In Thomas, Sir Richard 
Scott V.C. further stated that: 
 
“[i]t is not the bank’s business to ask itself why [the surety] was willing to do this. It was the 
bank’s business to make sure that she knew what she was doing.”xxxvii  
 
Hence, the bank is not expected to enquire into the personal relationship of the 
debtor and the surety, or their personal motives for wanting to help one another. 
The bank is entitled to rely on the solicitor’s certificate confirming that independent 
advice has been properly given.xxxviii 
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 This approach was affirmed by the Court of Appeal in Etridge (No.2) where 
it stated that the bank was entitled to assume that the solicitor, in undertaking the 
task of advising the surety, has considered himself to be sufficiently independent 
and will carry out his professional duty to his client. The court did, however, 
recognise that a distinction must be made between actual and potential conflicts of 
interest.xxxix In the former, the solicitor should decline to act if he is also acting 
(otherwise than in a purely ministerial capacity) for another party to the transaction. 
The court went further to state that, in surety cases, there may not necessarily be a 
conflict of interests between the husband and the wife, nor would the transaction 
always be one that is disadvantageous to the wife. If the parties’ marriage is 
secure and the indebtedness is being incurred for the business which provides the 
husband’s livelihood and on which the family’s prosperity depends, the court’s view 
was that there may not really be any conflict of interest. Thus, a solicitor is not 
necessarily disqualified from acting for the wife merely because he is also acting 
for the husband.xl This would be a matter for the solicitor’s professional judgment 
whether he can properly advise the surety or whether she should be advise to go 
to another solicitor. 
Two clear strands in the treatment of the solicitor’s independence and the 
conflicts issues emerge from Etridge (No. 2). The first sees the benevolent 
treatment of the issues of independence and conflicts in favour of banks. Here, the 
court has clearly indicated continued support for the approach that, once the bank 
has advised the surety to seek independent legal advice, the bank will not be 
affected by any deficiency in the advice given or the solicitor’s independence since 
these are matters for the solicitor’s professional judgment. The second sees the 
shift of responsibility from the banks to the solicitors whereby solicitors are now 
faced with the more onerous task of investigating matters such as the stability of 
their clients’ relationship, the commercial background of the transaction and the 
risks involved before giving advice. Given the greater burden placed on solicitors 
when advising sureties, one result is that solicitors will either advise sureties not to 
sign or increase the costs of giving advice since more care and work will have to 
be put into advising the surety and negotiating terms with the bank. Furthermore, 
the tension between the solicitor’s duties of undivided loyalty and confidentiality will 
be most acute in cases where the solicitor is acting for two or more parties. Hence, 
it will be increasingly difficult for solicitors to continue to do so without there being a 
greater risk of potential conflicts of interest turning into actual ones. 
 
Disclosure and Extent of Advice 
 
In Etridge (No. 2), the court observed how the provision of mere technical advice or 
the formal gesture of merely urging the surety to take independent legal advice, 
without ensuring that such advice is actually taken, may be of very little assistance 
to the surety. The court noted the significance of the solicitor being fully informed of 
all material information so as to enable him to offer adequate advice to the surety.xli 
However, the disclosure of material information to the solicitor will necessarily 
involve the disclosure of information which the bank may not be at liberty to divulge 
without being in breach of its duty of confidentiality to the debtor. A similar conflict 
of duty will arise where the solicitor acts for two or more parties in the transaction. 
The solicitor may acquire confidential information regarding the debtor in the 
course of acting for him in a previous transaction,xlii or whilst representing the 
parties in the present transaction.xliii In both instances, there will be a potential 
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conflict between the solicitor maintaining the confidentiality of the debtor and 
making full disclosure to the surety of all relevant information regarding the 
transaction. 
 Whilst recognising the “illusory” nature of the requirement, the exposition by  
the Court of Appeal in Etridge (No. 2) continues to retain the practical difficulties 
raised in the earlier cases regarding the conflicts issue. The court maintains the 
position that the party best placed to judge the extent of the advice to be given is 
the solicitor and not the bank. It is therefore a matter for the solicitor’s judgment 
whether he should advise the wife on the wisdom of the transaction or invite her to 
seek other advice, for example from the accountant of the business. In order for 
the solicitor to exercise this judgment, the solicitor must inform himself of the 
circumstances of the proposed transaction, the amount of the existing 
indebtedness and of the new advance, of the reasons for the new advance and/or 
the bank’s request for additional security, and to probe the stability of the parties’ 
marriage.xliv  
The practical effect of these requirements on the solicitor is to place a 
greater burden on solicitors to investigate the background of the transaction before 
advising the surety. But this may prove difficult if not problematic. Solicitors will 
need to tread with extreme care and sensitivity when probing the nature and 
stability of their clients’ relationships. In addition, the solicitor must acquaint himself 
well with his clients and their affairs so as to enable him to exercise his 
professional judgment. In other words, independent legal advice is no longer 
limited to merely giving advice on the nature and effect of the transaction but will 
entail commercial knowledge of the proposed transaction as well as an analysis of 
the risks involved. The availability of such information is clearly significant if the 
advice is to transcend mere technical advice. It will place the solicitor in a better 
position to offer more detailed advice to the surety on viability of the transaction, 
the risk that she is taking on by providing security and the available alternatives, 
including renegotiating the terms of the transaction. 
This approach, however, re-emphasises the point that the increased 
provision of information may place greater pressure on the solicitor to balance his 
duty of confidentiality with his duty of undivided loyalty to his clients with conflicting 
interests. On the one hand, the solicitor is bound by the former not to disclose 
information about the debtor’s financial matters to the surety. On the other hand, 
he is subject to a duty to disclose all material information to the surety. The solicitor 
faces the further problem of deciding whether the information in his possession is 
“material” and, thus, subject to a duty of disclosure. Cases like Halifax Mortgage 
Services v. Stepskyxlv and Mortgage Express v. Bowermanxlvi reveal the practical 
difficulties of determining whether the information is indeed material and that 
solicitors are not always “best placed” to determine where the fine dividing line lies 
between no-conflict and conflict situations. 
Bowerman and Stepsky were both concerned with situations where the 
solicitor acted for two or more parties to the transaction and in the process of so 
acting, had come by material information that was subject to conflicting duties of 
disclosure and confidentiality. In both instances, the solicitor had failed to 
appreciate the materiality of the information or to make disclosure to the client to 
whom the duty was owed. Bowerman illustrates that, in such a situation, the 
solicitor would be in breach of his duty of disclosure if he fails to disclose the 
information to the relevant client, even though the other client has not consented to 
his doing so. Stepsky further illustrates that, where there is a conflict between 
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these two duties, the only appropriate course of action for the solicitor would be to 
inform the surety of the conflict and refuse the retainer, unless the parties give their 
informed consent.xlvii   
As can be seen from Burch, the availability of information pertaining to the 
debtor’s existing borrowings and the current facility is crucial for the purposes of 
enabling the surety to assess the significance of the security, the extent of her 
potential liability and the risks that she takes on in providing security. The irony is 
that the solicitor is more likely to have in his possession the relevant financial 
information about the debtor than when he acts solely for the surety. In the 
absence of the debtor’s consent to disclosure, the solicitor will, however, be 
constrained in his advice. The conflicting duties of confidentiality and disclosure 
ultimately result in the solicitor resolving the issue by offering mere technical legal 
advice to the surety rather than detailed advice on the viability of the transaction. 
Hence, the solicitor’s duty of confidentiality will form an effective barrier to his 
giving such advice to the surety.  
Even where the debtor’s prior consent is obtained, several issues require 
consideration: firstly, the effect and validity of the debtor’s consent; and secondly, 
the extent of the disclosure permitted by his consent. The effect and validity of a 
generalised advance consent to disclosure as a defence to an allegation of breach 
of fiduciary duty has been questioned by the Law Commission.xlviii There was 
general opposition by both the Law Commission and the majority of respondents to 
the legitimation of generalised advance consents.xlix The main difficulty lies in 
distinguishing between acceptable and unacceptable practices by institutions when 
procuring the customer’s consent, which is to operate as a blanket consent 
covering both present and future disclosure of information.l It may not be feasible 
for a bank to rely on the debtor’s generalised advance consent since the validity of 
such consent may be open to challenge on the grounds of being too wide in its 
terms. Thus, it may be more practical for banks to rely on the ad hoc consent of the 
debtor to the disclosure of information that is pertinent to the current facility being 
granted.li 
 Another aspect of the debtor’s consent relates to the extent of the disclosure 
permitted by his consent. This further defines the scope of the waiver of the bank’s 
duty of confidentiality. The scope of the debtor’s consent should be such as not to 
undermine the purposive role of the independent legal advice requirement. Thus, 
an appropriate balance has to be struck between the debtor’s right to 
confidentiality and the need for the disclosure of information so as to enable the 
surety to make an informed decision about providing security. In that respect, 
Burch suggests that a bank should, at the minimum, be permitted to release 
information about the debtor’s existing borrowings and the details of the current 
facility, so as to enable the surety to gauge the extent of her potential liability and 
the risk that she is taking on in standing surety. A stronger position is taken in 
Etridge (No. 2) where Stuart-Smith L.J. observes that: 
 
“[i]f the bank is in possession of material information which is not available to the solicitor …  
the availability of legal advice is insufficient to avoid the bank being fixed with constructive 
notice.”lii  
 
Etridge (No.2) clearly indicates the court’s support for a higher standard of advice 
but leaves the issue of confidentiality of information in a conundrum. It fails to 
provide an adequate answer as to how the practical difficulties relating to 
confidentiality and disclosure are to be dealt with when the solicitor is called upon 
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to fully inform himself of all material information relating to the transaction. The 
judicial view has inclined towards placing some responsibility on banks to provide 
sufficient information to the solicitor so that more than mere technical advice may 
be given to the surety.  
It may, however, be argued that the approach taken in Etridge (No. 2) 
maintains a bank-sympathetic attitude by shifting the focus from the bank to the 
solicitor.liii Thompson argues that this is illustrated by the observation in Etridge 
(No. 2) that it would actually be unwise for banks to follow Lord Browne-Wilkinson’s 
suggestion of a private meeting with the surety, in the absence of the debtor.liv 
Instead, banks are better advised to involve solicitors so as to avoid allegations of 
negligence.lv Although the court had emphasised the importance of the solicitor 
being fully informed of all material information before advising the surety, the 
issues of confidentiality and the extent to which information is to be readily 
available was not fully addressed in Etridge (No. 2). Given the clear need for the 
availability of material information and the practical problems relating to 
confidentiality, the debtor’s consent should specify that the bank’s duty of 
confidentiality is waived to the extent that it is permitted to disclose information 
about his accounts that is relevant to the current facility, which shall include, but 
not limited to, making available a copy each of the application form and the bank’s 
letter of offer.  
The former will at least provide information about the new advance being 
applied for by the debtor, the financial performance of his business, and the 
purpose of the facility. It will also reveal the extent of the debtor’s existing 
indebtedness, thereby providing a helpful indication of his overall ability to repay 
the loan. The bank’s letter of offer will provide the surety with information on the 
new advance agreed to, the extent of the debtor’s borrowings from the bank and 
the various types of security required by the bank for granting the facility. This 
additional information will possibly help the surety to make a sounder assessment of 
the debtor’s ability to finance the current facility and the risk of enforcement of the 
security to be provided by her to the bank.  
Moreover, the Banking Ombudsman has recommended that the debtor’s 
consent should be obtained as a pre-condition to the availability of the facility 
granted and extend to include the periodic disclosure of information relating to his 
accounts and other securities given in respect of the current facility for the duration 
of the surety’s security.lvi Even then, it should be noted that the debtor’s consent 
will not necessarily eradicate the existing conflict between the parties’ respective 
interests or the solicitor’s need to balance those interests when giving advice to 
each client. In an attempt to balance these parties’ conflicting interests, the solicitor 
may not be able to provide detailed or partisan advice so as to satisfy the 
purposive role of the independent legal advice requirement. Thus, it would be 
increasingly necessary for separate law firms to act for the parties in a surety 
transaction so as to reduce mistakes, conflicts of interest, as well as to improve 
standards of conveyancing practice. 
 
Solicitor’s Capacity to Advise 
 
It has been observed that, in most instances, the solicitor’s advice is limited to 
technical legal advice, covering the nature and effect of the transaction.lvii 
Although Etridge (No. 2) lends support to the need for a higher standard of advice, 
it has been questioned whether solicitors have the necessary expertise to meet 
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this higher standard of advice and offer sureties not only an explanation of the 
legal effect of the security document but also advice on the financial wisdom of the 
transaction.lviii The issues raised are twofold. The first is concerned with the 
solicitor’s role in the solicitor-client relationship. The second focuses on whether 
solicitors have the necessary technical expertise to assess the financial viability of 
a transaction so as to offer such advice to the surety.  
In Burch, Millett L.J. suggests that, not only will the solicitor’s advice be 
subject to scrutiny by the courts but the solicitor should also ensure that his advice 
is followed by his client, failing which he should refuse to act further for that client.lix 
To some extent, Millett’s reasoning is captured in the Law Society’s guidelines on 
professional conductlx which provides that the solicitor’s capacity to provide 
impartial and frank advice must not be impaired by allowing the client to override 
the solicitor’s professional judgment.lxi Millett’s statement has, however, been 
criticised for making too many assumptions about the solicitor-client relationship.lxii  
 Firstly, the statement assumes that solicitors generally control the solicitor-
client relationship and that clients will always follow their solicitors’ advice. In 
contrast, Cain found that it is clients who usually determine their own desired 
outcomes rather than their lawyers, and that most clients are the ones who 
announce their needs and set the objectives for their solicitors.lxiii She observes 
that the role of a lawyer is that of a translator. The client’s issues, which are framed 
in everyday terms, are translated and reconstituted in terms of legal discourse 
which have trans-situational applicability.lxiv Cain recognises that there may be 
countervailing pressure on the lawyer’s choice of translation that results in his 
either transforming the client’s chosen objective into a “reasonable one” or refusing 
to translate altogether.lxv There may even be instances where the client is not 
seeking advice but merely legitimation of her decision through independent legal 
advice.lxvi Given that clients are the ones who generally determine their desired 
outcomes, Cain concludes that lawyers are not the controllers of the 
relationship.lxvii  
 Moreover, it has been argued that solicitors are not always motivated by 
altruistic motives when advising clients. Drawing on the example of the duty 
solicitor scheme, Mungham and Thomaslxviii found that, despite the image of 
altruism projected by the legal profession, the self-interest of the profession is 
actually placed in priority to any sense of community or client interest. Further, 
Gennlxix, following Galanter’s one-shotter/repeat player analysislxx, notes that the 
strategy adopted by parties in the negotiation process will often depend on whether 
one is a one-shotter or a repeat player. A one-shotter will usually choose a strategy 
that will minimise the risk of maximum loss, while a repeat player will adopt one 
that which will maximise long-term gains, even if short-term maximum losses result 
in individual cases.lxxi  
Genn further observes the structural imbalance between the one-shotter 
and the repeat-player. This causes not only a disparity between the parties in 
terms of access to legal advice but also serves to exacerbate the parties’ 
inequalities.lxxii Genn argues that one-shotters have little control over the conduct 
of their claims and, hence, the strategy adopted by their solicitors is crucial. 
Solicitors can take one of two negotiating strategies: cooperative or competitive.lxxiii 
Following Galanter, Genn finds that a solicitor is more likely to adopt a cooperative 
strategy where, for example, he is professionally integrated and has a financial 
interest in maintaining a good working relationship with the defendant and/or other 
members of his profession.  
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In surety cases, a professionally integrated solicitor will attempt to balance 
this interest with his duty to provide impartial and frank advice by offering no more 
than mere technical legal advice to the surety. These observations make it 
increasingly harder to support the view that solicitors may act for two or more 
parties in a surety transaction and yet give legal advice that is truly independent to 
the surety. The countervailing pressures of acting in the best interests of each 
client, coupled with the solicitor’s own self-interest in the process, may pose an 
effective barrier to the solicitor’s independence and his ability to give detailed, or 
partisan, advice to the surety that a higher standard of advice will require. In 
addition, a solicitor who is professionally integrated will adopt a cooperative rather 
than competitive strategy in negotiating the terms of the security document for the 
surety. 
 The second issue is whether solicitors have the expertise to offer advice 
which will touch on the viability of the transaction. Genn observes that there is a 
direct relationship between a solicitor’s advice and the extent of the information 
made available to him. The lack of or limited access to information will affect both 
his ability to make a sound assessment of his client’s case and to offer reliable 
advice.lxxiv In surety cases, this suggests that the bank should, at the very least, 
make available to the surety copies of the debtor’s application form and its letter of 
offer since these will provide the necessary information about the debtor’s existing 
borrowings and details of the new advance.  
The Law Society has laid down guidelines for solicitors regarding the 
acceptance of a retainer and duties of the solicitor in fulfilling that retainer. A 
solicitor must not act where the client cannot be represented with competence or 
diligence.lxxv The guidelines further provide that the solicitor must carry out his 
client’s instructions with care and skill.lxxvi This suggests that a solicitor is, to some 
extent, capable and competent to judge whether the scope of his retainer and the 
advice required of him by the client is within his expertise or whether he should 
advise the client to seek advice from another adviser. Most solicitors will have the 
competence to assess the information provided in these documents relating to 
matters such as the debtor’s existing borrowings, the extent to which this is being 
extended by the current facility, the other types of security being requested from 
the debtor and whether there is any great disparity between the value of the 
security being requested for from the surety and the amount of the current facility. 
Thus, they are capable of offering advice on the viability of the transaction in terms 
of the short-term risks involved in giving security.  
It is, however, debatable whether solicitors, not being accountants or risk 
managers, are competent to offer detailed financial advice on the projected 
performance of the debtor’s business and the long-term risks involved. This may 
pose an effective limit to the extent of the legal advice which a solicitor may be 
able to give to the surety. In such cases, the advice that the solicitor is likely to give 
to the surety is either do not sign or seek further financial advice, rather than 
expose himself to allegations of negligence and breach of professional conduct.lxxvii 
Thus, there remains certain limitations to the effective protection of all sureties by 




As matters stand, Etridge (No. 2) maintains the position that a surety transaction 
will be unimpeachable so long as the bank stresses to the surety the need to take 
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independent legal advice and the solicitor acknowledges that an explanation has 
been given to the surety. Cases  like Burch and Etridge (No. 2) have indicated a 
shift away from the earlier post-O’Brien cases where the independent legal advice 
requirement had focused mainly on form, rather than substance. In order for the 
requirement to be satisfied, the Court of Appeal in Etridge (No. 2) has clearly 
recognised the significance of a solicitor being fully informed of material 
information so as to enable more detailed advice to be given to the surety. 
However, a higher standard of advice and the need for greater disclosure of 
confidential information may bring greater potential for conflicts of interest, 
particularly between the solicitor’s duties of undivided loyalty and confidentiality. 
The increased provision of information regarding the debtor’s financial 
standing would place a surety in a better position to assess both the extent of her 
potential liability and the seriousness of risk of enforcement of the security. With 
material information being made more readily available to sureties and their 
solicitors, solicitors should be better placed to give more than mere technical legal 
advice and, to some extent, provide advice on the viability of the transaction. It is 
further hoped that advisers will pick up on the Banking Ombudsman’s 
recommendation to ensure that a surety is advised of her continuing liability under 
the security and the method of termination of her liability.lxxviii  
However, a word of caution is still necessary in surety cases. This shift in 
emphasis from form to substance in the independent legal advice requirement 
does not necessarily mean that sureties come out faring any better. Instead, the 
approach has become even more bank-sympathetic where responsibility has 
clearly shifted away from the bank to the solicitor. In future, the surety is less likely 
to succeed in protecting her home on the basis of an O’Brien defence and her only 
remedy may be against her solicitor. In addition, independent legal advice should 
not be seen as a panacea for advantage-taking until further consideration is given 
to issues such as those involving disclosure and confidentiality. Even with the 
increased provision of information, it remains debatable whether solicitors do 
indeed have the expertise to offer detailed advice on the financial wisdom of a 
transaction beyond merely short-terms risks. Given that more care and work will 
have to be put into advising sureties, the result will necessarily be increased costs 
for the surety. 
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